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Neurophysiological mechanisms of psychotic symptoms
j Abstract Psychotic symptoms are supposed to be
expression of highest order brain functions such as
symbolic thinking, language, planning, empathy or
complex emotional reactions. However, due to its
historical roots, current psychiatric symptomatology
is based on descriptions of disturbed behavior, which
refer to metaphysic concepts rather than to brain
function. Therefore, modern biological research suf-
fers from an important gap between psychiatric
semiology and contemporary knowledge in systems
neurophysiology. The authors argue for a redefinition
of psychiatric symptoms in a neurobiologically
meaningful way. Based on recent empirical studies,
this strategy is exemplified for auditory verbal hallu-
cinations and formal thought disorder. In these
examples, characteristic psychiatric symptoms can be
related to circumscribed structural and functional
alterations in the language system, allowing the
description of clinical phenomena in terms of
neurobiological events. This strategy is also applicable
to other psychotic symptoms like emotional dysreg-
ulation and catatonia, where disturbances of the
functional circuits of mood and motor regulation,
respectively, are predicted. This approach to psychi-
atric symptoms is based on contemporary evidence
concerning systems neurophysiology and is expected
to provide meaningful and testable hypotheses for
future research aimed to a better understanding of the
pathogenesis of psychiatric disorders, to more accu-
rate prognosis and to better targeted therapeutic
strategies.
j Key words psychosis Æ psychopathology Æ
modularity Æ hallucinations Æ thought disorders
Introduction
The physiological basis of high order brain functions
such as symbolic thinking, language, planning,
empathy or complex emotional reactions is not yet
fully understood at the systems level, and, in partic-
ular, no single brain region was identified to distinctly
represent any of these functions. Accordingly, there is
a major conceptual dilemma in modern psychiatry
since the foremost paradigm postulates brain dys-
regulation as the basis of psychiatric symptoms, but
there is an evident gap between observed symptoms
and systems physiology. The authors will show the
need for a reformulation of psychiatric semiology in
order to match the behavioral observations with the
respective neurophysiological mechanisms.
Historically, the development of current psycho-
pathology was guided by the idea of psychiatry as a
science dealing with metaphysical phenomena, arising
independently from observable brain processes [14].
This was obviously inspiring the symptom definitions,
which were formulated avoiding any reference to
known functional neurological circuits. No reference
was made, e.g. to speech and language perception
physiology although the so-called formal thought
disorders are objectively assessed by disturbances of
spoken language. Furthermore, fear as a physiological
phenomenon with its biologically clearly defined
behavioral consequences fight, flight or freezing is not
considered in the context of psychosis. Rather, pos-
sible cognitive equivalents of these fear-reactions in
humans like verbal fight or false accusations are
interpreted as distortions of judgment, and avoidance
as emotional flattening. To focus the point: in the
context of psychosis, aroused emotional states are
implicitly supposed to be secondary to the cognitive
state and, therefore, psychopathologically negligible
as diagnostic signs.
These examples show that current psychiatric
semiology contains implicit theoretical assumptions
about causality, and that possible alternative hypoth-
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tant since evidently every psychopathological scale
detects symptoms according to their a priori defini-
tion. The consequences for scientific reasoning and for
empirical research are far-reaching. If disordered
speech is labeled as a thought disorder, and thought is
understood as a complex, metaphysical phenomenon,
then the way back to brain function is closed. Conse-
quent to this dilemma, modern biological psychiatry
rarely refers directly to psychiatric symptoms and the
respective psychological functions (e.g. thought,
judgment, mood); instead, psychological constructs
are applied, which were developed in other contexts
like developmental psychology (e.g. theory of mind) or
neuropsychology (e.g. working memory, executive
function) and can be related to the function of distinct
brain circuits. While this is, of course, a legitimate way
to overcome the dead end of psychopathology, it is not
really a satisfactory one. In fact, the gap between
psychiatric symptoms and their underlying brain
functions is thus just substituted by a new, unresolved
gap between psychiatric symptoms and psychological
constructs. E.g. it is not clear how the major symptoms
of schizophrenia like hallucinations and thought dis-
orders could be generated by subtle working memory
deficits. Such a relationship appears to be easier for the
construct of Theory of Mind, where it is hypothesized
that a pathological deficit of empathy may lead to
delusional false interpretations [1]. This is an inter-
esting approach which, however, tacitly inverts the
cognitive paradigm of classical psychopathology
which assumes a paranoid delusion to be a primary
disorder of judgment and not a secondary, emotion
driven cognitive distortion. This is a promising
hypothesis, but it should be clear that this explanation
implies a new hypothetical bridge from Theory of
Mind to the clinical symptoms which needs empirical
confirmation. There is a similar problem with respect
to the concept of genetic endophenotypes, which allow
establishing hypothetical relationships between
behavioral phenomena and a genotype. In this case,
however, an even larger gap is open between genotype,
systems physiology of the brain and behavior.
Although several different research strategies are
possible and the verdict about their success or failure
is determined by the results, the evident shortcomings
of traditional psychopathology due to their implicit,
anachronistic theoretical framework appear to im-
pede a meaningful translation of behavior to systems
physiology and genetics.
Neuronal networks, distributed circuits,
processing domains and behavior
j The neurobiological perspective
The stratification of complexity in the human brain
follows rules that can be understood by their ana-
tomical location, e.g. the primary, secondary and
association cortex, and the basal ganglia, but only up
to the level of organized perception (Gestalt) and
movements (Movement Patterns). Higher psychic
functions are not located in circumscribed brain re-
gions but are supposed to result from the interaction
between distributed brain regions. This means that
the emerging phenomena are the equivalent of one or
more additional levels of complexity that rely on the
functional relationships between brain regions rather
than on circumscribed local activity. From a neuro-
biological perspective one may thus identify the dif-
ferent levels of complexity in the activity of single
neurons and neuronal assemblies, local networks and
large scale neuronal circuits. Local networks and their
activity are not assumed to explain complex cognitive
operations. They refer to groups of physically con-
nected neurons which are synchronously active and
rather appear to be the carriers of modality specific
representations; in the sensory modalities these may
be the equivalent of mental images, and in the motor
domain, of movement patterns. Mental operations, on
the other hand, can be understood as combinations,
interactions and sequences of such representations.
This is possible due to massive distributed connec-
tions provided by the long distance white matter wi-
rings. The highest order of complexity in brain
function is thus reflected by distributed neuronal
circuits, which are not defined by simultaneous acti-
vation but rather by interactions between brain re-
gions, the temporal dynamics of the system and the
output at the behavioral level.
j The psychological perspective
Until today, the psychological perspective on brain
functioning is determined by the concept of infor-
mation processing. In its first formulations, the pro-
cess was understood as a single channel with limited
capacity. It could be regularly fed or overloaded, and
psychological experiments were designed in order to
segregate information processing into distinct steps.
It became evident, however, that a single, serial pro-
cess is not sufficient to explain the complexity of
human behavior. An early formulation of the parallel
processing theory implied splitting of the information
stream, and the processing of distinct information
packages in specialized subroutines, which are sup-
posed to work simultaneously and join together to
form the final behavioral output [5]. A limitation of
the original formulation of parallel processing for the
explanation of complex brain functions is the
assumption of highly specialized, encapsulated sub-
routines excluding top down inputs.
A modern formulation of the parallel processing
theory consists in massive modularity. It complies
with the evidence of top down, i.e. state dependent
modulations of cognitive processes. Subroutines are
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organized in functional units, which can be identified
as specialized neuronal circuits. These circuits are
modulated by the general systems state which means,
in psychological terms, by memories and intentions.
Further implications include the key-lock principle,
which makes a distinct upstream routing device to
screen, classify and assign information packages
superfluous. Rather, the large-scale availability of
information in a massively networked system allows
each module to respond only to its specific domain,
which is defined by the format rather than by the
content of the information.
Massive modularity allows clarifying some crucial
issues around the function of specialized brain cir-
cuits. In this view, e.g., the question of whether the
fusiform face area is specialized to human faces (e.g.
[11]) is ill targeted. Instead, the region is specialized
to a particular visual pattern; let’s say ovals with a
structured surface. This specific format of the infor-
mation is the key for being processed by the module;
its content and the meaning, in this example a par-
ticular face, is not the prerequisite of the input, but
the output, i.e. the result of the module’s processing.
Similar forms are equally treated as a proper input
and duly processed and distinguished, like animal
faces, car fronts or the moon. Correspondingly, the
domain of the language system is not language itself,
but acoustic packages with the format of syllables.
Words, sentences and meanings are, again, not the
domain of the system but its output. The concept of
massive modularity very much approximates the idea
of a possible translation between the psychological
and the neurobiological level of observation. It further
provides the domains as a useful conceptual distinc-
tion between format and content of the information as
the key to enter the processing of a particular module.
Finally it is compatible with the notion of the brain as
a self organizing system making the existence of an
intelligent upstream router superfluous [2].
j Consequences for a biological psychopathology
To better understand how psychiatric signs and
symptoms can be translated into brain dysfunctions,
it appears necessary to rely on normal brain functions
which can be related to both, psychiatric symptom-
atology and distributed neuronal circuits with distinct
tasks and output. As shown above, psychological
modules can be understood as the equivalent of dis-
tributed circuits, and one key is to define the domain
of specialization based on the format of the infor-
mation rather than on its content. This prerequisite is
not fulfilled by the disturbances of thought, judgment
or mood to which psychopathology traditionally re-
fers. They are defined based on content and meaning.
Psychological modules like working memory or
attention, on the other hand, are well studied in terms
of brain circuitry. However, their relationship to the
specific signs and symptoms of psychosis is unclear.
The intriguing hyperarousal/information overflow
theory exemplifies the dilemma, since the respective
clinical syndrome is rarely and, at most, only transi-
torily seen in psychosis. It is highly unspecific and
cannot be easily linked to the specific pathophysiol-
ogy of psychosis.
To recruit the modern concepts of brain modules
and circuits for the neurobiological understanding of
psychotic symptoms, possible candidates for the
generation of psychotic symptoms must be concretely
nominated, however [6]. For this purpose it is helpful
to identify a critical communication breakdown as a
common denominator of the clinical condition of
psychosis, and then to look at the major domains of
human communication. Three important communi-
cation domains can be attributed without difficulty to
specialized brain circuits: The left hemispheric lan-
guage system for verbal, the limbic system for emo-
tional and the antero-medial motor loop for the
psycho-motor behavior; the latter being crucial for
non-verbal communication, e.g. of sympathy or
intentions. A respective formulation of psychopa-
thology aimed to match clinical phenomena to these
circuits has been developed recently and is currently
being validated by our group. While the clinical
expressions of dysregulations of the limbic loop are
not trivial to identify, the disturbances of psycho-
motor behavior and of language are easier to under-
stand. Research is still in its beginnings regarding
such a strategy. However, based on symptom oriented
investigations, several interesting results are already
available with regard to the language system in
schizophrenia. In the following part we will review
findings regarding those psychotic symptoms, which
can be directly attributed to the language circuitry,
namely the auditory hallucinations, and formal
thought disorders.
The pathophysiology of auditory hallucinations
Hallucinations as they typically occur in schizophre-
nia commonly contain spoken language in the form of
words or entire sentences. Their relationship to the
language system of the human brain is therefore
evident. However, until recently the involved brain
regions and the dynamics of their emergence were
unclear.
One distinctive feature of hallucinations is their
physical intensity similar to a real perception, and the
subjective sense of being externally generated [3]. In a
fMRI study in hallucinating patients with schizo-
phrenia Dierks et al. [4] showed, that during auditory
hallucinations besides motor speech (Broca’s) area
the primary auditory cortex (Heschl’s gyrus) in the
language dominant hemisphere was activated. The co-
activation of the left temporal primary auditory cortex
can be thus understood as an abnormal excitatory
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phenomenon which is related to the subjective expe-
rience of a real acoustic stimulus. As such, this region
adds a vivid physical quality to a conscious event in
the language domain. In other words, a conscious
verbal content may be identified as internally - self -
or externally generated based on the simultaneous
neural activity of the primary cortex [16].
The intrahemispheric connection between the
frontal and the temporal language related regions is
provided by the arcuate fascicle. The lateral part of
this fiber bundle connects the inferior prefrontal
lobe with temporoparietal areas at the end of the
sylvic fissure and the superior temporal lobe. When
comparing two groups of patients with schizophre-
nia, one with patients who either hallucinated fre-
quently and another who had never experienced
hallucinations, with normal controls, the group of
hallucinating patients had a specific increase of
directionality (MRI fractional anisotropy) of white
matter tracts in the lateral part of the arcuate fascicle
pronounced in the left hemisphere. This effect was
present compared to both, normal controls and non-
hallucinating patients with schizophrenia [10]. This
indicates a structural increase of the fronto-temporal
connections of the language circuit which is consis-
tent with a functional dysregulation between speech
generating frontal and speech perceiving temporal
regions.
It was hypothesized that a higher directionality of
the arcuate fascicle facilitates the pathological retro-
grade co-activation of the primary auditory cortex as
part of the described dysfunctional systems state
representing the auditory hallucination [15]. How-
ever, it remains open, whether this finding is the
primary, neurodevelopmental cause of the suspected
excitatory derailment of the temporal lobe or whether
it is a phenomenon of neural plasticity following a
chronic state of hyperactivity of the language circuit.
Early evidence that auditory hallucinations are
connected to anatomical structures and pathways re-
lated to the language system came from the fact that
patients with lesions in these regions e.g. due to tu-
mors, infarctions, hemorrhages or epileptic foci, not
only suffered from speech disturbances, but eventu-
ally also from auditory hallucinations. Support for the
hypothesis that auditory hallucinations are misinter-
preted inner speech and closely related to physio-
logical language circuits recently came from a case of
a 63 year old woman with a vascular and traumatic
injury of the left frontal and temporal language re-
gions described recently by Hubl et al. [9]. This pa-
tient was dysphasic after the acute lesions. During
recovery, she developed epileptic spikes in the left
superior temporal lobe, and auditory verbal halluci-
nations. While she recognized external speech e.g. of
the nursing staff as normal, she was able to recognize
that voices she hallucinated had the same dysphasic
speech difficulties like herself. Taken together these
studies provide evidence that different aspects of the
psychiatric psychopathological symptom of halluci-
nations are related to specific parts of the language
processing and generation system bridging the gap
between psychopathology and brain function.
Formal thought disorders and the language
circuit
Another group of symptoms which can be related to
language dysfunctions is formal thought disorder. It is
still a heterogeneous group of phenomena which, in
linguistic terms, can be defined as errors in logical
sequencing and grammar, loosened or restricted
associations or as an increased or decreased flow and
quantity of speech. Several studies have demonstrated
functional and structural deficits in the left superior
temporal regions particularly consistent when related
to formal thought disorders [13]. These results are
consistent with studies demonstrating receptive lan-
guage deficits in schizophrenia. Examples of func-
tional changes related to language processing are the
reduction of the P300 amplitude at left temporal re-
gions which was correlated with the performance in a
verbal memory task [7, 17], and the reduction of the
neuronal (fMRI) response during the generation of
speech which was attenuated with increasing formal
disorders of language [12].
These studies do not differentiate between activa-
tion deficits and abnormalities of spontaneous activ-
ity. This is due to the method which is only able to
detect difference values between basal activity and
activity increase after stimulation. Thus, the alterna-
tive explanation is possible, that the relative activation
related to a specific brain function is reduced due to a
ceiling effect in an intrinsically hyperactive region.
Therefore, to obtain a more complete picture of the
neuronal activity during rest and functional activa-
tion, absolute perfusion measures are required.
In a recent study, Horn et al. [8] investigated the
relationship between grey matter volume, absolute
blood perfusion in language related brain areas and
formal thought disorders in a group of patients with
schizophrenia and healthy controls. In accordance
with previous studies, in the left temporal lobe a re-
gion with reduced gray matter volume was found.
Further, there were interesting correlations of formal
thought disorders with grey matter volume on one
hand, and absolute perfusion on the other. In par-
ticular, formal thought disorders were associated with
reduced grey matter volume and increased perfusion
in left superior posterior temporal regions, and with
increased perfusion but not with grey matter volume
in left infero-prefrontal areas. Together with previous
activation studies these results are interpreted as an
indication that formal thought disorders are charac-
terized by a structurally impaired Wernicke’s region




The example of the language circuitry shows that an
empirically based translational approach from sys-
tems physiology to psychopathology is possible. A
similar approach can be, in principle applied to the
other major communication domains, namely affec-
tivity and motor behavior. While motor behavior
appears to be easily accessible to such a conceptual-
ization, affectivity is less trivial since it is intricate
with thought, judgment and behavior in a largely
unknown extent and with unclear causalities. The
effort, however, to better identify specific symptoms
which can be translated to the activity of brain cir-
cuitries appears to be worthwhile since it may rep-
resent an important step towards the understanding
of the nature of psychoses.
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